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Abstract
Objectives: The objective was to identify the effect of the Alternative Quality Contract (AQC), a global
payment system implemented by Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) of Massachusetts in 2009, on emergency
department (ED) presentations.
Methods: Blue Cross Blue Shield of Massachusetts claims from 2006 through 2009 for 332,624 enrollees
whose primary care physicians (PCPs) enrolled in the AQC, and 1,296,399 whose PCPs were not enrolled
in the AQC, were evaluated. A pre–post, intervention–control, propensity-scored difference-in-difference
approach was used to isolate the AQC effect on ED visits. The analysis adjusted for age, sex, health
status, and secular trends to compare ED use between the treatment and control groups.
Results: Overall, secular trends showed that the number of ED visits decreased slightly for both
treatment and control groups. The adjusted analysis of the AQC group showed decreases from 0.131 to
0.127 visits per member/quarter, and the control group decreased from 0.157 to 0.152 visits per member/
quarter. The difference-in-difference analysis showed the AQC had no statistically significant effect on
total ED use compared to the control group.
Conclusions: In the first year of this AQC, we did not find evidence of change in aggregate ED use.
Similar global budget programs may not alter ED use in the initial implementation period.
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As concern over health care spending grows,novel payment systems are increasingly beingimplemented by public and private payers to
contain costs without compromising quality.1–3 Global
budgets, which reimburse provider organizations based
on a prospective budget for each enrollee, are consid-
ered a strong method of controlling spending compared
to shared savings systems that use a spending target,
but do not place providers at financial risk. The effect of
global budgets on emergency department (ED) use is
not known.
Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) of Massachusetts
implemented the alternative quality contract (AQC), a
global budget contract, in 2009. This contract is similar
to pioneer accountable care organization contracts
recently implemented by Medicare, which are intended
to contain spending and improve quality.4–6 The AQC is
a global budget system where primary care provider
groups are accountable for spending and receive
bonuses for meeting quality benchmarks. BCBS initi-
ated the AQC in its health maintenance organization
(HMO) and point-of-service enrollee population. These
enrollees are each required to designate a primary care
physician (PCP). In 2009, seven physician organizations
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began participating in the AQC; this represented 321
primary care practices and more than 4,000 physicians.
The details of the AQC have been previously published
and an analysis of the first and second year reported
that the AQC was effective at lowering total medical
spending and improving quality.7–9 The three primary
features that distinguish the AQC from other provider
contracts are the shared provider risk for overall health
care spending of enrollees, performance bonuses up to
10% of the budget, and support from BCBS in quality
improvement and budget management. In the first year
of the AQC, the savings were achieved largely by refer-
ring patients to lower-cost providers as opposed to
reductions in use. While designed to control spending,
such a global budget system is not designed to hinder
those with severe acute illness from seeking appropriate
ED care. Instead, its purpose is to control spending by
encouraging physician groups to use resources more
efficiently. Nevertheless, spillover effects on ED use are
possible—either with increased use due to poor primary
care access or with decreased use due to improved
management of ambulatory care. It is therefore impera-




This was a pre–post, intervention–control, difference-in-
difference approach to best evaluate the AQC effect on
ED utilization. The study was reviewed by the Univer-
sity of Michigan institutional review board and met
exempt status.
Study Setting and Population
The state of Massachusetts was the study setting; the
study population was composed of BCBS enrollees of
all ages. The time period evaluated was from January
2006 through December 2009 and included 1,634,514
members from 2,335,593 total HMO and point of service
members. We excluded those members not continu-
ously enrolled for at least 1 calendar year (701,079). All
providers with BCBS patients were included, both those
participating in the AQC and those not participating.
Study Protocol
The unit of analysis was the enrollee, and an ED visit
was determined by Current Procedural Terminology
(CPT) codes: 99281–99285. The dependent variable was
the total number of ED visits per member per quarter.
The preintervention period was from 2006 through
2008. The AQC went into effect in 2009 and this was the
postintervention time period. BCBS enrollees designat-
ing PCPs in practices participating in the AQC were the
intervention group. Enrollees with PCPs not assuming
risk under the AQC were the control group.
To account for differences at the level of the individ-
ual between intervention and control groups, we con-
trolled for age categories, interactions between age and
sex, risk score, and secular trends. Risk scores were cal-
culated by BCBS from current diagnoses, claims, and
demographic information, similar to the diagnostic-cost
group (DxCG) scoring system (Verisk Health, Eden
Prairie, MN).10 This risk score is similar to the DxCG
scoring system employed by the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services for risk adjustment of payments
to Medicare Advantage Plans. In this scoring system,
claims with higher scores denote lower health status
and higher expected utilization. Additionally, we
included a health plan fixed effect to address differences
in benefit design and clustered standard errors at the
physician practice level to account for variation between
group practices. Covariates included in our model were
chosen carefully to account for known differences in
health care use based on sex, age, and comorbidities.
Time variables, as well as interaction between time and
the AQC intervention, were included to control for any
confounding temporal trends that may affect results.
Data Analysis
A multivariate linear model with propensity scores was
analyzed at the enrollee-quarter level. The basic
assumptions required for conducting linear regression
were met (i.e., normality, homoscedasticity, linearity,
and absence of strongly influential multicollinearity and
outliers). The propensity scores used age, sex, and risk
scores to balance individual traits between intervention
and control groups. The model included independent
indicator variables for the intervention, each quarter,
the postintervention period, and interactions between
each indicator and the intervention (see Data Supple-
ment S1, available as supporting information in the
online version of this paper, for further details). An
interaction between the intervention and postinterven-
tion period indicators allowed us to isolate the effect of
the AQC on ED use. Huber-White corrections were
used to adjust standard errors for clustering of multiple
observations at the level of the PCP practice.11,12 All
analyses used STATA software, version 11 (StataCorp,
College Station, TX). Results are reported with
two-tailed p-values, with no adjustment for multiple
comparisons.
RESULTS
The individuals in the intervention (AQC) group were
younger, were more likely to be male, and had more
favorable (lower) risk scores compared to those in the
control group. There were differences in ED use
between groups prior to the AQC implementation. In
the years 2006 through 2008 the adjusted average num-
ber of ED visits per enrollee per quarter for the AQC
group was 0.067 and for the non-AQC group was 0.082
(Table 1).
Overall, secular trends showed ED use decreased
similarly for both treatment and control groups. The
adjusted analysis of the AQC group showed decreases
from 0.131 to 0.127 visits per member/quarter, and for
the control group, decreases from 0.157 to 0.152 visits
per member/quarter. The difference-in-difference analy-
sis showed the AQC had no effect on total ED use com-
pared to the control group. The difference-in-difference
analysis of each CPT code showed no statistically signif-
icant difference for the four most complex CPT codes,
but there was a small increase in visits in the least com-
plex 99281 visits (Table 2).
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DISCUSSION
This analysis shows that in the first year of a program
bundling payments to PCPs, ED use did not change.
This should be reassuring to critics of global payment
systems concerned that such payment structures will
prevent necessary emergency services. However, it also
shows that, at least in the first year, primary care–based
global budget strategies are not sufficient to divert low-
acuity patients to alternative settings. In AQC years
after 2009, BCBS has reported a decrease in low-acuity
visits as a result of targeting this group specifically. It
will be important to evaluate if rewarding PCPs based
on reductions in ED visits for low-acuity problems such
as medication refills or suture removal provides suffi-
cient incentive to improve primary care clinic access.
The ED adds value to the health care system provid-
ing timely access to health care through its 24/7 model.
This is invaluable for serious acute illness when the
rapidity with which care is provided can improve the
outcomes for individuals. For this reason, these results
are promising because ED use was not rationed under
the AQC payment model. Although the promise that
enhanced continuity and quality incentives would
decrease low-acuity ED use did not occur in the first
year, it will also be important to monitor if our null find-
ing in ED use continues in subsequent years of the
AQC.
LIMITATIONS
Selection into the intervention group was nonrandom;
therefore, the usual limitations of observational studies
that concern the validity of the counterfactual apply.
However, preintervention trends did not differ between
treatment and control groups, suggesting that differ-
ences in the outcome were attributable to the interven-
tion. One confounder may be varying exposure to the
intervention, but a sensitivity analysis including only the
individuals continuously enrolled for the entire evalua-
tion time (48 months) yielded similar results, suggesting
that this is unlikely.
The study population only included members enrolled
in a BCBS HMO or point-of-service program, and
Table 1
Characteristics of the Intervention and Control Groups*
Characteristic
Intervention Group (N = 380,142) Control Group (N = 1,351,446)
Before AQC (2006–2008) After AQC (2009) Before AQC (2006–2008) After AQC (2009)
Age (yr)*, mean (range) 34.4 (15.8–53.0) 35.3 (16.8–53.8) 35.3 (16.9–53.7) 35.5 (16.7–54.3)
Sex (% female) 52.6 51.2 51.8 51
Health RISK SCORE† (mean) 1.08 1.16 1.11 1.16
AQC = alternative quality contract; PCP = primary care physician.
*Age is listed as the mean and 1 SD below and above the mean. The total number of patients in each group exceeds 1,634,514
because there were individuals with PCPs in each group for greater than one year between 2006 through 2008.
†The health risk score takes into account the health status of the enrollee. The score is calculated using the diagnostic-cost group
(DxCG) scoring system (Verisk Health, Eden Prairie, MD). The score is derived by statistical analyses using national claims data,
current-year diagnoses, and demographic information. The DxCG is similar to Medicare’s Hierarchical Condition Category sys-
tem, but more detailed and designed for younger persons.
Table 2


























0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000† <0.000
99282 0.017 0.015 0.013 0.011 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.082
99283 0.070 0.067 0.057 0.055 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.829
99284 0.045 0.046 0.037 0.037 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.945
99285 (highest
complexity)
0.022 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.399
All ED visits 0.157 0.152 0.131 0.127 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.606
*All results represent ED visits per member per quarter. The AQC/intervention group represents those enrollees whose PCP par-
ticipated in the AQC in 2009 and the non-AQC/control group comprised enrollees with primary care physicians who were not
part of the AQC system.
†Results displayed are rounded to the thousands decimal place for ease in reporting.
AQC = alternative quality contract; CPT = Current Procedural Terminology; PCP = primary care physician.
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therefore our findings may not be generalizable to
preferred-provider or indemnity plans. The analysis was
performed at the visit level, not the individual level;
therefore, our analysis does not account for individuals
who may have had multiple visits. Also the study popu-
lation was young, so the Medicare population may have
different results.
Another limitation is that each AQC varied slightly
by practice group. Although each was similar in its
global payment model using financial incentives to
achieve quality measures, this study did not evaluate
the details of each contract nor changes in ED use
individually. It is possible that some groups were able
to reduce nonurgent ED use or that other groups saw
increased ED use, while the overall AQC cohort effect
was one of no significant change. In addition, our anal-
ysis covers only the first year of AQC implementation.
The intervention was derived with intent to have a
positive effect over the course of the 5-year contract,
and therefore results may differ in subsequent years of
the AQC. However, our analysis helps understand what
to expect in the initial year of similar multiyear global
budget systems.
Although the ED can be an expensive health care
venue compared to a clinic, PCP global payment sys-
tems are not directly targeted to change ED utilization.
Global budget incentives should stimulate groups to
actively avoid unnecessary ED visits by improving
urgent care access and care management overall. Our
analyses were designed to look at overall ED use and
not to discern effects on truly emergent versus non-
emergent uses of the ED. CPT codes are not intended to
define emergent or nonemergent use of the ED, but
showed that more complex visits (99282–99285) showed
no significant change, and the least complex (99281)
visits showed a very small, but statistically significant
increase. Additionally, critical care and observation
codes were not included in our model and thus are not
captured in our analysis. Critical care codes were omit-
ted to avoid redundancy, as critical care billing can be
separate from the codes analyzed for private insurers
like BCBS, and any changes in observation admissions
should have been identified in previously reported
assessments of the AQC.
In year 1 of the AQC, while the global budget incen-
tivizes careful resource use overall, no benchmarks spe-
cifically rewarded or penalized PCPs for enrollee use of
the ED. This highlights a limitation of analyzing ED use
based only on the AQC, despite our efforts to isolate its
effect. As with the aggregate analysis, the effect may
grow over time as the groups adapt to AQC incentives.
CONCLUSIONS
In the first year of this global budget payment model,
we did not find evidence of change in aggregate ED
use. Future research of similar policies will be important
to assure appropriate access for patients in need of ED
services. This may help to coordinate acute unscheduled
care to optimize limited financial resources.
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